

2 JUN 1978

DRAFT OUTLINE OF A PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH
ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Objective: To explain to the American public the apparent dichotomy of simultaneous competition (e.g., Africa) and cooperation (e.g., SALT) with the Soviet Union

I. Introduction - Perspective

A. Fundamental to recognize that U.S. and Soviets are inherently in competition:

1. Soviets and U.S. are respective leaders of two opposing military alliances which collectively have the power to destroy civilization
2. There is a gap between our aspirations and purposes in the world and those of the men who rule the USSR. We expect the Soviet Union to compete with us in advancing goals and values that are widely divergent from ours. We do not presuppose agreement about basic goals in the international system and within the states that comprise it. Soviets practice and preach a totalitarian, repressive, and closed society. The US a democratic/free/open one.
3. Soviet Union sees military action/assistance as the heart of successful influence abroad. To the U.S. it is the antithesis. We see the inclination of the Soviet leadership to permit the transfer of military instruments to dominate

their foreign policy and seizing opportunities of the moment by promoting rather than quieting violent conflict in Africa. The USSR has turned a cold shoulder to the requests of developing countries seeking to enlist Soviet cooperation, along with that other developed industrial states, in building a new and more equitable international economic structure. The Soviet Union's claims of magnanimity and unselfish interest in building strong and independent new countries in the Third World would have a more credible ring if backed by a positive response to these entreaties rather than by a policy of pouring oil on local tribal and racial fires in Africa. In southern Africa, we see a growing Soviet tendency to obstruct political solutions to the problem of achieving majority rule by enlarging the scope of violence. We continue to see large-scale and expanding Soviet use of Cuban surrogates in different parts of the African continent--armed, equipped, transported and sometimes led by Soviet military personnel. Cuban forces are engaged in killing Africans or in training others to do so. All of this behavior betrays a thinly-disguised ambition to exploit internal African problems in order to advance unilateral Soviet interests with the use of military instruments. The Cubans, who profess to be non-aligned, function in Africa as proxies of this great power.

B. Also fundamental to recognize that the U.S. and Soviet Union have important interests in common:

1. Our common desire to avert nuclear war provides both sides with the strongest possible reasons to control our strategic relationship. That common interest persists today--and for our part, we intend to continue in our common endeavor to negotiate a SALT agreement.
2. Given the vast military power at the disposal of our two countries and the conflicts of interest inherent in the divergent nature of their societies, competition between them, if not bounded by mutual restraint, can quickly and irreversibly assume the most dangerous proportions. Therefore, the basic Soviet-American competition must be tempered by cooperation as well in order to control risks.

II. Reasons why competition cannot be abandoned:

- A. We have the clear obligation as leader of free world to counter balance Soviet increase in real military strength.
- B. We have responsibility to help smaller, weaker nations who face subversion by an alien and hostile ideology.
- C. Not forget that we are a nation founded on the principles of freedom and human rights and that we have progressively, especially in this century, taken on a world leadership role to help other nations realize their destinies openly, exercising freedom of choice and without fear.

- D. We cannot abrogate that role now, not as long as we still believe in those ideals.
- E. We can stand up against nations, large and small, who threaten to destroy those rights. Some nations have no one to turn to but the U.S.
- F. We have an obligation to keep the West and Third World informed of the true motivation behind Soviet/Cuban actions and the extent and implications of their activity.
- G. We have the obligation because of our strength and prestige to speak out in exposing the abuses of the Soviet model of society and to show the world the truth and their hypocrisy. We are answerable for our actions, we must hold them equally.

III. Reasons why cooperation must be pursued:

- A. Arms control agreements are one of the means we have for enhancing the security of the United States and its allies. The SALT agreement now under negotiation, if successfully concluded, will enlarge the spectrum of strategic weapon systems to be regulated by mutual agreement. It is our obligation as custodian of the West's nuclear arsenal to enhance the security provided by those weapons by using our leverage to limit Soviet arms development and deployment. We have the obligation to enhance stability by reassurance to Soviets of our rationality and defensive posture.

IV. Difficulties in striking the balance:

A. Soviet proclivity pursue resolution pol conflicts by arms.

1. Lack confidence other means
2. Poor theology

B. Dangers of mil competition

1. Strategic

- a. Overlay on world for past 33 years -

Don't understand -

Arsenals growing

Must try limit, esp. U.S. vulnerability

Conventional mil

Soviet buildup Europe unreasonable

V. Conclusion

A. Moving both directions at once

1. Cooperation -

- a. Soviets must show cooperation

We've offered, opened negotiations CTB,

Indian, conv arms transfers, ASAT, etc.

- b. Soviets not forthcoming

2. Competition

- a. Telling world what's happening

Record clear

Ethiopia

Zaire

Repetition past attempts manipulate

Egypt - Somalia

Encouraging others help selves

- a. Willing respond - not blank check -
not willing assume load - help others, e.g.,
Koreans, realize own potential
- b. Conviction that self-realization key goal for
individuals and nations.
- c. Avert nuc catastrophe -

Like to do w/negotiations

Will do w/armaments if nec -

Up to Sovs

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